Using the lens of Clegg's Circuits of Power (CoP) framework, this study examines the resistance to a UK information security certification scheme through three episodes of power that led to its withdrawal in 2000. The UK authorities sought to generate market competition between a generic certificate scheme with lower costs and international recognition and one based on technical rigor, but they failed in their objectives because of resistance from organizational players. This paper makes contributions to the understanding of the discursive nature of resistance to change in the research of standards and certification, and contributes to the literature by formulating the concept of discourse resilience: the property of discourses to resist change. It identifies the nonagentic nature of resistance in the absence of coercive power and presents a reflection on legitimacy as a required attribute for the acceptance of a certificate scheme. The research finds that what organizations deem to be legitimate is the result of power.
Introduction
Information security standards and certification schemes have played a significant role in helping organizations safeguard information assets against a variety of internal and external threats. One example is the first security standard for information systems -BS 7799 -which evolved into an international standard now known as ISO/IEC 27002. In this sense, Barnard and von Solms [5] discuss the importance of BS 7799 and its certifications for securing e-commerce practices while Gomes and Velez [35] highlight their value in the Health Sector. With the emergence of new technologies such as cloud computing and biometrics there is a constant need to formulate national and international national standards in the field of information technology security (see [64] ). However, Brunsson et al. [11] argue that "the development of standards is often a political and conflict-laden process" involving a variety of players from different domains with different interests, such as government authorities, certification agencies, experts and potential standard adopters. From the literature, we learn that security standards can have an impact on organizational information security practices [71, 6] . Hence, we argue that by studying the processes that bring standards and their respective certification schemes into being we are able to understand the content and practices associated with their implementation (e.g. [3, 11] ). Such findings can bring theoretical and practical knowledge to those developing information security policy and security standards for the next period.
This research investigates an early attempt by industry stakeholders to implement a certification scheme, known as c:cure, for the information security management standard BS7799 in the UK.
In discussing the importance and dynamics of standards and certification schemes, prior studies of certification predominantly using economics as research theory range from market penetration strategy [6, 9, 69] , the economics of user involvement [19, 28] , and its relationship with institutional and technological change [2, 74] . Overall, the economic perspective assumes that the motivation for standardization arises from the economic and strategic incentives in market penetration and diffusion [27] : organizations make rational choices when choosing to obtain certification, weighing up the balance of cost and benefit. Nonetheless, critics have questioned the mechanistic and hegemonic view of certification, which was dominant in the economic approach [8, 84] . Brunsson et al. [11] argue that from the perspective of organization studies, standardization is "essentially a dynamic phenomena" where tension and conflicts among different interest groups are most likely to emerge during the creation, promotion and distribution process. IS scholars have also demonstrated the political nature of various information technology standardization processes [37, 56] . Therefore, in this research, we align our theoretical position with these researchers, and draw on Clegg's Circuits of Power (hereafter CoP) framework to examine the complex social and political interactions embedded in the process of developing the certification scheme. This gives rise to our research questions : 1) what is the role of power in influencing the rejection or acceptance of standards certification scheme ? 2) what are the theoretical lessons that can be learnt from this particular case? To address the research questions, we first examine the literature on standardization with a particular focus on the perspective of power and resistance. We then discuss the theory chosen to support the analysis: Clegg's [16] Circuits of Power (CoP). After this, we present our case in three key episodes. Each episode is followed by an analysis in terms of CoP. There follows a discussion formulating the main conceptual contributions of the analysis and reviewing their implications vis-à-vis the literature. The paper concludes with reflection on the scope and value of our research.
Power, Resistance and Standardization
In the IS security literature, the dominant research work on information security policy has concerned the organizational level including studies on end-user security policy compliance [73, 17, 40] and the role of management support and organizational culture [44, 47] . While these studies enhance our knowledge with respect to organizational and behavioral aspects of information security policy implementation, we found that only a few researchers have looked beyond the organizational boundary to examine the origin of industry-wide information security standardization. For instance, Backhouse et al. [3] draws on the CoP to examine the negotiation and interaction among different agencies during the BS 7799 development in the UK. Their study explains how exogenous contingencies triggered the need for security standards and identifies how power relations bind the different actors so they form alliances which eventually engender the legitimacy of the certification scheme, which the authors found, was crucial for the standard development. Their findings indicate that success relies heavily on making the certification scheme an obligatory passage for all relevant industry actors which required the realignment of political interests and decisions [13] . Others have drawn from institutional perspectives to discuss the effect of regulatory authority and industry competitors on the organizational adoption of information security policy [43, 44] . These studies tend to concentrate on the role of professional and certification bodies. The purpose of our paper is not to reject or invalidate alternative approaches to studying standards but to complement them by adding a power perspective. Accordingly, to identify the complexities of engaging multiple parties in standardization, we review the literature studying power and politics, and in particular the roles these play in forming the consensus and fostering the legitimacy which are essential during standardization processes [14, 27, 77] Even though organizational researchers have not concentrated specifically on aspects of resistance to and rejection of standards and their certification, some of them have focused on power-related phenomena such as resources, stakeholders' relations and negotiations. For example, Boström [10] discusses the importance of power resources for standards organizations in achieving credibility and authority, and the problem of the power shift resulting from the imbalance of power among key actors. In particular, he highlights the value of symbolic resources in maintaining moral legitimacy during the standard setting process. Fransen and Kolk [33] argue that multi-stakeholder standards can offer a more effective power balance among business and social representative of interest groups. Nunez-Nickel and Gutierrez [58] demonstrate the relevance of the political context in influencing the performance of independent professionals. Similarly, Dokko et al. [22] challenge the assumption of technological determinism of diffusion and argue that shaping and selecting technological standards is mediated through the social process of negotiation, debate and interaction between the participating organizations.
Drawing on negotiated order theory, they demonstrate the dynamic interaction between technological change and social order.
Thus, while several studies have pointed to aspects of power in standard creation and the subsequent implications [3, 80, 77, 9] , the concept of resistance, especially discursive resistance, has not been extensively discussed,. The term discursive resistance is used here in the Foucaultian [30, 31, 32] sense denoting resistance to knowledge conveyed in symbolic form. We argue that this type of resistance is relevant when agencies proposing certification schemes have no access to power in the form of authority or other disciplinary resource. Therefore, we argue by drawing on the literature in management control and organization studies that resistance is an important part of analyzing standards creation, since the failure to identify and manage it can have an impact on the acceptance or rejection of the associated certification scheme. We explain below the concept of resistance and its relevance to this research.
In sociological studies researchers have conceptualized resistance in power relationships as the opposite of induction [65] . Induction in this context means asking someone to do something he or she would not do of his or her own will [18] . Induction is normally interpreted as positive power while resistance is perceived as the source of negative power [16] . This notion of resistance as negative power has been, for example, the conventional approach to theorizing labor resistance to management control [76, 68, 50] . Fleming and Sewell [26] argue that earlier literature on resistance primarily focuses on the analysis of observable resistance such as official strikes and worker protests, and ignores the informal aspects of resistance such as meaning and routines [60] .
Helin and Sandstrom [39] illustrate how a code of conduct ethics was resisted in the Swedish branch of a US company and find "resistance through distance" a more ambiguous and informal dimension of the concept of resistance. Resistance to induction, or positive power, is central to our study of certification scheme acceptance or rejection. A group of agencies -those proposing the scheme -attempt to induce others to adopt it.
Although researchers in the field of organizational studies have begun to consider resistance as something less visible and more subtle, in the area of standardization and certification this perspective has not been explicitly applied. As we discuss in the next section, resistance and power are not single dimensional and observable phenomena. Power and resistance are intertwined with language, discourse, rules of meaning and membership as well with techniques of production and discipline. It is this multi-perspective that makes CoP such a powerful lens for analyzing our case. Our conceptualization of resistance as a multi-directional activity links to Rus's [65] argument defining "power as a cyclical relationship of induction and resistance" (p.7).
He argues for the need to move beyond the conventional dichotomy between induction and resistance to see resistance "not in negativity but rather in means, in the subject of power, or in rule of domination" (p.7). On the one hand, Rus recognizes the need for studying resistance related to discourses, but on the other, he acknowledges the complexity and difficulty of researching such phenomena. Accordingly, in the next section we introduce our theoretical lens, the CoP. In so doing we discuss its main concepts and argue its suitability as a lens for studying standards certification scheme creation. We begin by illustrating the perspective on tension and politics in standardization, and argue for the value of resistance analysis in this particular context.
Theoretical Background

Clegg's Circuits of Power
Clegg [16] conceives power as relational, i.e. power exists among two agents who are associated or connected in some way; it is the force that keeps social systems coherent. Therefore from this perspective an organization, understood as organized collective action, is the result of power. For Clegg power in organizational fields is manifested through the production of specific outcomes: tangible products or institutionalized practices. Organizational and social outcomes are possible as the result of relations among persons: relations sustained by power.
Three perspectives on power are integrated into the three circuits of power. The first circuit, the circuit of episodic power, is defined by the relationship between two types of agents: As and Bs.
The As make the Bs do something they would not do otherwise; note that if the Bs agree with the As' wishes, then no power is exercised [32] . This view of power as conceived in the relation between As and Bs is similar to the one of induction as mentioned above. Clegg warns however that just looking into the circuit of episodic power is not enough to understand the power phenomenon. There is a need also to consider the conditions that secure access to and control of the resources that ensure compliance and allow As to have power over Bs: what Clegg calls the standing conditions constituted by the other two circuits of power, social and systemic integration. This is the most evident of the circuits. In the case of studying the acceptance or rejection of standards we determine that the As in the relationship are those proposing the standard certification scheme while the prospective recipients of the scheme are the Bs. We can say, then that the As are inducing [65] the Bs to accept the scheme.
The second circuit, the circuit of social integration, is composed principally of rules of meaning and rules of membership. The rules of meaning refer to how different groups interpret events and objects. This is closely related to the power of discourse described by Foucault, who indicates that power is exercised by virtue of how we interpret events and by what we believe to be true [31] . The rules of meaning are also related to the concept of legitimacy as defined by institutional theorists [57] : in effect the power to decide what is legitimate. The rules of membership refer to power originated by individuals' association with particular groups. Groups, in this case, can be formal groups in an organization and, for example, hierarchical in nature, such as senior management, middle management and ordinary employees. Groups can also refer to public authorities and occupations such as police officers or doctors, whose power stems from their association with social institutions [30] , or in the case of the manager, derived from the institutionalized manager-employee relationship that is underpinned by a legal contract. For the purposes of our study, the rules of meaning are related to the interpretation and legitimacy of the proposed scheme. When Bs resist the adoption of the certification scheme in terms of challenging its legitimacy, we call this resistance discursive [65] .
The third circuit, the circuit of system integration, refers to the material conditions such as the means of production and technologies which afford an organization the production of goods and services, as well as its surveillance practices. Although the interpretation of power provided by the first two circuits mentioned above is incisive, our understanding of the power relation between As and Bs should be complemented by consideration of the systemic integration circuit.
The compliance of the Bs with organizational objectives ensures systemic integration. Systemic integration here is understood to be a high degree of cohesiveness in an organization that permits the production of goods and services, and Clegg distinguishes two major concepts: techniques of discipline and techniques of production. The techniques of production refer to material means and procedures drawn on by organizations to generate goods and services, while the techniques of discipline refer to the measures and methods. In the employee example, the techniques of production refer to the definition of tasks in which employees are directed by managers while techniques of discipline would be used if an employee were to dissent from her managers' wishes. When studying resistance to the certification scheme, the techniques of discipline refer to any means the agencies proposing the scheme might deploy to enforce the adoption. As presented in the case, these agencies lacked such resources giving rise to the difficulties encountered in promoting the certification scheme. This is similar to what Boström [10] refers as fundamental power resources for the acceptance of standards.
The circularity of the framework is manifested when the repeated actions of Bs' compliance become institutionalized and integrated into the other two circuits. Returning to the earlier employee example, after continuous repetition the practice of Bs reporting all their activities to As becomes an institutionalized technique of production and discipline. At the same time the institutionalization of this practice will also reinforce the social and working relations between As and Bs. Changes to the circuits of power are induced by exogenous contingencies; i.e. events that are outside the realm of an organizational field or an institutionalized practice. Thus, the CoP provides an appropriate theory of interpretation of our case because it integrates different theoretical perspectives. It allows us to analyze the certification process not only as a strategy for legitimation as suggested by institutional theory, but also to integrate contingent factors such as particular agents' maneuvers and exogenous contingencies.
Research Method
Of the various research approaches, we consider that a case study is most suitable for this context for several reasons. First, the case study approach is suitable for studying processes -such as c:cure's implementation -in which context and actions are closely related [83] . Indeed prior research has demonstrated the value of a case study approach in analyzing the complexity of standardization and certification process [3, 15, 56] . Second, case studies enable theory development as part the result of an iterative relation between data and concepts [23] . In this study we use the CoP as the underlying framework to guide our fieldwork and reveal a richer picture of social phenomena in which there are different power actors engaged in the standardization and certification process. While this case might be old, the example of power interaction remains relevant to the current standardization research. As Aggarwal et al. [1] contend, there is need to have a deeper analysis (such as the use of case study research) on "specific standard-setting situations" where stakeholders have different degrees of power" (ibid p.459). Our main method of data collection was semi-structured interviews with those involved in the development, marketing and administration of the certification scheme. We were able to gain good access to key actors in the scheme and 14 interviews were conducted. As Table 1 
Data Analysis
The approach adopted for analyzing the data consisted in drawing on our theoretical framework to tease meanings out of the case narrative. In so doing we conducted a dialogical process between data and theory [48, 81] . Rus [65] suggests that when analyzing the cyclical relationship of power comprising induction and resistance,
The unit of analysis of power accordingly cannot be a thing, a person, an act, a relation, and also not a status, it can only be the entire context within which the dialectic of power takes place.
This was fundamental for articulating our findings [23] and the analysis was conducted in three steps. The first step was to highlight key themes and major events that took place between 1995 and 2000. Case study notes were prepared containing the responses of the interviewees, summaries of the questions and answers, and comments on documents provided or physical observations. Key themes were then identified and discussed, at the same time; a chronology of the events was also developed. The second step was to derive the three circuits from the interview notes, documents and findings established in the previous episode. The objective was to identify the power agents, the resources and the meaning of membership that are significant in understanding the attempts to institutionalize the c:cure scheme. The third step was to offer an in-depth analysis of the basis of the narrative. Although the information had been analyzed and discussed among three independent researchers, to validate our interpretations we decided to share them with the actors involved and fortunately a number of our interviewees offered their services for reading the manuscript and providing feedback. Overall, our informants validated our interpretations but where there was divergence we made explicit their views in our interpretations.
The Case Study: The Resistance to C:cure
In this section we present the case study along with our analysis. c:cure (a timeline of the events is presented in Table 2 below) was never adopted by a critical mass of organizations and was eventually withdrawn. The purpose of our analysis is to explain its failure from a power perspective and we identify how power struggles hindered the integration of the three circuits.
We posit that the lack of integration in the three circuits of power, the result of resistance from different actors, the presence of contradicting discourses, and the lack of disciplinary techniques, ultimately explain why the scheme failed to be widely adopted. For purposes of clarity we have divided the case into three episodes. Each episode is followed by an analysis using each of the circuits of power. 
Episode 1: Initiation of A BS7799 Certification Scheme
To address the rising concern over the increasing number of information systems security Following the publication of BS7799, the idea of establishing a certification scheme gathered momentum. The original outline for certification against Part 2 of the BS7799 standard was drawn up by the BS7799 Industry Working Group and discussed at a public consultation workshop in December 1995. Shortly afterwards, this Group submitted a final draft for an accredited certification scheme to the DTI. Following the findings of the report, the DTI concluded that alongside the usual generic certification there was a special need for a second certification scheme for BS7799. Under this generic certification, the audit checks that establish the fitness of the applicant organization for certification against the BS7799 standard are performed by employees of an accredited certification body, such as one of the global management consultancies. The accreditor organization receives accreditation, not the individuals performing the actual certification audits. In the c:cure scheme, however, the assessor/auditor must be personally assessed and accredited -a much more stringent check on the quality of the auditor performing the review, and it was argued that c:cure was therefore a higher quality certification. Both DTI and BSI considered that the requirement of "auditor competence" would be "sufficient to establish c:cure as the preferred BS7799 certification brand".
The chair of the BS7799 International User Group (IUG), later known as the Information Security Management Systems (ISMS) group, recalled the rationale behind the idea of c:cure:
After publishing BS7799 in 1995, the Group (the BS7799 Industry
Working Group) decided to look into the idea of certification. While working on Part 2 of the standard, the Group also started a pilot project looking at a certification scheme. UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service) wanted to have different schemes in order to maintain a competitive accreditation environment.
In August 1996, the DTI published a document outlining its ideas on "certification against BS7799: Code of Practice for information security management" and a 1997 consultancy report set out a plan emphasizing the crucial nature of:
• Speed to market (an interim scheme was proposed even whilst c:cure was being finalized)
• Compliance with the 'open market' requirements of EN4500 and with the UKAS obligations in the international arena to earn mutual recognition.
• Quantification of market demand for the scheme, in keeping with UKAS requirements
Hence there were various stakeholders with different interests. UKAS, the body sitting at the apex of all accreditation in the UK, desired to see competition amongst schemes in order to stimulate demand for high quality certification. BSI, both as a certification body providing generic certification but also as the business manager for the c:cure certification scheme, stood in a rather ambiguous position. It did not want to forgo income from the generic certification yet as the premier UK standards body accepted the desire for a higher quality level of accreditation.
However, for many potential applicant organizations the choice of two competing paths to certification against the same standard simply resulted in confusion, having the effect of preventing progress on developing security: which way was the right way to go?
Analysis of First Episode Through the Lens of the CoP
For the purposes of our analysis we start by identifying the As and Bs of a causal episodic relationship. The As are constituted by the DTI, the BSI and UKAS whose missions were to ensure the security of electronic trade and the creation of standards and certification schemes. The
Bs of the power relationship are constituted by those British organizations interested in demonstrating that their information systems were secure. The prime objective of the As was to ensure that through the adoption of the c:cure scheme and therefore much better security, the growing information-based economy in the UK would thrive and prosper. To achieve their objectives the As were prepared to countenance the two competing certification schemes: (1) c:cure, a rigorous scheme provided by specialized auditors and (2) the generic scheme offered by traditional consulting companies providing certification services. The As considered that competition between the two schemes would be fruitful. It would extend the coverage and enhance the quality of the implementation of the underlying standard (BS7799).
From the perspective of social integration, we can appreciate the exercise of power in this circuit through the belief held by the As that offering two competing schemes would improve the quality and extent of certification of information security management. The dominant discourse here is the value of market forces and of competition in enhancing quality and engendering widespread adoption.
Another salient discourse in the circuit of social integration was that of rigor and technical detail.
According to this, the As believed that, given c:cure's more stringent technical demands, the Bs would consider c:cure to be superior to the generic scheme. Here the belief is that specialization and rigor are fundamental for the acceptance of a security management certification scheme. The dominant notion is that technical detail and specialization should be interpreted as values of the utmost importance. Hence, the As believed that c:cure would facilitate and nurture e-commerce by sending out to all a strong message of quality and trustworthiness. Thus, the analysis of this circuit identified two main discourses emanating from the As: (1) competition is valuable and (2) the quality of the scheme is directly proportional to its technical rigor.
Through the lens of systemic integration, we identify that the most tangible technique in this circuit was the certification scheme itself. It consists in the auditing and issuance of a certificate of conformity with the information systems security management standard BS7799. The scheme can be considered a prime example of a technique of discipline and production. The As believed that the effectiveness of the scheme would rest on its detailed and rigorous content; i.e.
organizations adopting the scheme would be able to claim more manifestly secure information systems. Moreover, the certification scheme was designed with the purpose of having a disciplinary effect, so that organizations would have to adopt it in order to demonstrate competence and legitimacy for practicing e-commerce. However, in embracing a market discourse the As forwent the deployment of disciplinary techniques to force the adoption of the certification scheme.
Episode 2: Launch of C:cure Scheme
In August 1997 the DTI established the BS7799 Accredited Certification Steering Committee and appointed BSI-DISC, a unit of BSI, as the scheme manager. This Committee consisted primarily of trade and professional representative bodies providing input to the scheme manager on the scheme's development, marketing and funding.
To demonstrate its commitment and determination to the BS7799 Accredited Certification have given serious consideration to all the security threats they face, and that they have put appropriate safeguards in place.
In September 1998 the c:cure auditor assessment criteria and examination syllabus were published, underlining the high quality of the certification. Meanwhile, the DTI decided to establish the c:cure scheme as a fully self-funded program, i.e. no further funding from DTI. The c:cure Steering Committee concluded that the financial resources would be generated from three sources: the sale of BS7799 certification guides, the annual c:cure maintenance fee charged to certificate holders between full audits, and 12% of the relevant audit fee charged by the certification bodies to applicant organizations. One emerging paradox was that while a sub-unit of BSI (BSI-DISC) was the business manager for the scheme with key responsibility to promote c:cure, BSI also numbered as one of the vendors of the cheaper generic route to certification. Several organizations (i.e. Bs) viewed their participation as reluctant or passive rather than voluntary and active. For example, IRCA described the process of their involvement as one of being "dragged kicking and screaming" into the scheme -in other words, there was considerable pressure placed on them by the government to become a c:cure certification body. UKAS, likewise, complained of being pressured to participate in the scheme. As one interviewee told us, as the consultation forum of the c:cure scheme continues, our participation was primarily characterized as passive or absent.
The lack of strong industry support was reflected in a number of industry surveys that showed that there were still many businesses in the UK entirely unaware of the security management standard, let alone any certification scheme. The annual Business Information Security Survey 1998 found that only 25% of its 1000 respondents (covering manufacturing, public and service organizations) had even heard of BS7799 and only 5% were planning to seek certification at some stage.
Analysis of Second Episode Through the Lens of the CoP
The circuit of social integration draws our attention to discourses and how they are interpreted. In our case we identify a prominent discourse influencing As' actions and their corresponding interpretations. It derives from economic rationality, linking and emphasizing the role of market forces and their legitimacy. This was expressed in the report from the Systems Company consultants, suggesting that the c:cure scheme should be credible and affordable. The first required attribute of credibility, legitimacy, related to the belief that the scheme had been prepared by reputable industry experts. The second attribute, affordability, on the other hand centered on the economic rationality of the scheme. The rationale was that the cost had to be lower than its value or, as suggested in the literature, that the costs could be transferred to customers [38, 61] .
There are contradictory interpretations regarding the legitimacy of the As' alliance. To buttress their argument for the legitimacy of the c:cure scheme, the As announced that the scheme had been prepared "in consultation with industry"; this was the main discourse of legitimacy for the scheme. The Bs may have interpreted this to mean that if the scheme had been prepared "in consultation with industry", then it would follow that most relevant organizations would adopt it:
the dynamics of mimetic forces. However, most Bs did not believe that the scheme had been genuinely prepared "in consultation with industry". Our data shows that organizations were aware that arm-twisting had been applied and were unconvinced by the arguments for the c:cure scheme. Thus the discourse of the As identified here is that the certification scheme was formulated in "consultation with industry", and hence legitimate, while for the Bs the scheme was an imposition, expensive and complex.
From the point of view of the circuit of systemic integration, we observe that the method of hiring consultants as a technique to achieve As' objectives was resorted to constantly throughout the case. Consultants were hired with the purpose of conducting a study to determine the feasibility of the more specialized certification scheme. The report emphasized that such a scheme had to be launched quickly and comply with national and international requirements for that type of certification. More importantly, the report stated that before its creation and launch the DTI and its allies had to ensure that there was enough demand in the market. Our data shows that the As moved ahead with their plan because of their strong belief in the value of having two competing schemes and in the technical virtues of c:cure. Then after making the decision to go ahead with the new scheme, the As hired another consulting firm. The task of these consultants was to design the content of the scheme as well as its plan of implementation. Accordingly, the consultants' report specified the scheme's protocols and its auditing requirements. The overreliance of the As on the technique of hiring consultants bears some reflection. First, the reports did not show how the attributes (credibility and affordability) that were stated as key to the success of the scheme would be clear to prospective certificate applicants: how a more rigorous scheme requiring specialized auditors would be worth the extra expense. As one interviewee told us, "firms have spent too much money on getting certification for ISO 9000 and other purpose. In this case (security management), it was more important to have security policy in place within the organization, the issue of security certification was not really important." Second, the reports never warned the DTI about the risks of having two competing certification schemes -the potential ambiguity and confusion created by having two schemes was not foreseen. Third, one of the consultants' reports presented an over-optimistic forecast for demand for c:cure certificates.
Finally, once the impending demise of the scheme became evident, it was a consultant report that recommended abandoning it. Following this kind of advice hardly ensured a coherent and consistent approach for the As. 
Analysis of Third Episode Through the Lens of the CoP
At the end of the case we observe that very few Bs were enrolled wholeheartedly into the As plans. Our analysis shows that none of the circuits of power achieved integration and here we summarize the main reasons. First, British organizations did not adopt the scheme in large numbers. Second, few industry experts responded to the call made by the steering committee to join the ranks of auditors conducting the scheme assessments. Third, those organizations which had joined the steering committee of c:cure, i.e. the members of the As' alliance, harbored serious doubts about the viability of the scheme and remained in the committee only with reluctance.
By scrutinizing the circuits of social integration and episodic power we observe that the meanings assigned by the As to the scheme were not the same as those assigned by the Bs. For example, the As' strategy of two competitive schemes was interpreted differently by the Bs: they were eventually confused by the choice of two schemes. The discourse espoused by the As was that the scheme was legitimate and rigorous, while for the Bs the scheme was confusing and onerous.
What is interesting here is to notice how the discourse of the Bs prevailed over that of the As since, most Bs chose not to adopt either scheme until the confusion had been cleared. As discussed below, we call resilience this property of a discourse that prevails over a competing one. In a similar manner, international bodies were also confused by the presence of two certification schemes and followed the same course of action as their British counterparts; i.e. they adopted a policy of wait and see. In addition, prospective auditors interpreted the content of the scheme not as being more sophisticated and attractive, as the As intended, but as too difficult and complicated. We note here the resilience of Bs discourse, which prevails over that of the As.
One outcome of these disparate interpretations, of these contradicting discourses, was a smaller than expected pool of suitably accredited auditors. Worse still, industry saw the c:cure accredited auditors not as experts and specialists but, in some cases, as consultants of dubious quality converted in an ad-hoc manner from other kinds of auditing into security auditors. Nor did the Bs recognize the economic benefits, as the As had expected, of adopting a more expensive scheme when a cheaper rival (the generic option) was also available. Many Bs, retail banks for instance, through their bilateral contractual relations with suppliers were still able to ensure compliance with BS7799 to the satisfaction of their commercial partners without needing to be certified. The direct competition from the generic scheme, as well as the availability of other ways in which to enforce and demonstrate compliance with the standard, undermined the credibility of the discourse espoused by the As that c:cure was economically viable. The analysis of the case from the lens of the social integration circuit reveals the reasons for the actions of As and Bs. The organizations that were supposed to accept the discourses associated with the scheme: technical sophistication, economic viability and widespread industry acceptance -not only rejected those discourses, but also countered them with alternative discourses; that the certification scheme was confusing, onerous and localized (UK centered).
Analysis through the lens of the circuit of systemic integration shows that a constant theme in the case was the As' deployment of market-driven techniques. This was evident in the decision to allow market competition, eventually a major reason for confusion because the existence of competition drew attention to the commercial infeasibility of c:cure. With two certification schemes in the market, British organizations could compare the costs of one scheme against the other. Market estimates calculating the demand for c:cure might well have been off-target because they may have not considered the impact and availability of the other certification scheme. Furthermore, market estimates could have failed to factor in the existence of contractual relations between organizations that forced them in any case to comply with BS7799. In addition, the DTI overestimated the demand from prospective auditors to be enrolled and accredited into the scheme.
The analysis of the case from the perspective of the systemic integration circuit highlights the failure of the techniques adopted by the As. By over-depending on consultants and market studies, the As underestimated the challenges in designing and implementing a rigorous and proprietary scheme that had to compete with another which was generic and more affordable.
Surprisingly, the most glaring mistake made by the As consisted in the techniques that they did it did not happen, perhaps to be expected given the strong market orientation. Indeed, there are several general lessons that can be drawn from this analysis and they form the main topic of the next section.
Discussion
In this section we discuss the implications of our study. The discussion is structured around the insights derived from our analysis and by the CoP. The underlying assumption is that c:cure was a technique of production proposed by the As to alter the current circuits of power of the organizational field comprised of British organizations interested in information systems security.
In our discussion we also articulate the main contributions of our paper: formulating the concept of discourse resilience to explain resistance in the circuit of social integration, reflecting on the power struggles to determine legitimacy and establishing the role of non-agentic resistance in the absence of facilitative power. These theoretical implications are not generalized to predict which competing standards win, rather they are analytical generalization focusing on contributions to the extent body of knowledge of standards and certification scheme [52, 81] .
Resistance from Resilient Discourses
We found that resistance to the introduction of c:cure arose from prevailing discourses in the circuit of social integration, specifically in the extant rules of meaning. The discourse with which the As promoted the scheme was one of technical rigor. However, the Bs of the relation did not accept this discourse because they interpreted it through a simple economic discourse: the scheme was too expensive and confusing. Organizations, the Bs of the power relation, interpreted the proposal of the As with the rules of meaning prevailing in the extant circuits of power; that of market economy in which the principle of total utility [41] prevailed: i.e. given the availability of a generic certificate that was enough to convey compliance and that at the same time cost less, the need for a higher quality certificate was not justified for the Bs. As our case shows, eventually the market economy discourse prevailed. The marginal utility discourse, that prefers low cost, resisted the discourse of technical rigor and developed in consultation with industry. Despite the As efforts the Bs did not change their interpretation.
The resilience of the marginal utility discourse over other discourses in a market of standards and certification can also be found in other empirical research [63, 53] . Reinecke et. al. [63] suggest, for example, that in case of the presence of multiple certification organizations will tend to choose the most economic option to avoid higher costs. Their findings are related to our research, as the cost of c:cure was one of the main reasons given for its non-adoption. Lee and Oh [53] studied the failure of the Chinese government in promoting WAPI as the standard of wireless networking and one main reason for its non-adoption was its higher cost in comparison with its main competitor WiFi. We conclude that in the absence of facilitative power exercised by the As, the dominant discourse in the circuits of power will tend to prevail. Facilitative power here refers to deploying techniques of discipline to ensure compliance.
In cases where the resilience of a current discourse is strong, the As may consider deploying techniques of discipline. The resilience of an extant discourse can be weakened through the promotion of different rules of meaning but, we argue, it will still require the exercise of facilitative power as in the case of ecological friendly and environmental sustainability discourses, in which public opinion is not enough to induce structural changes in organizational fields. For example, Sarkar and Young [67] found that organizations are reluctant to adopt "green" IT because of its high costs; despite acknowledging the positive effects this technology may have in the environment. We conjecture that had the British Government introduced regulations supporting c:cure, certification would have been widely adopted and changes to the circuits would have stabilized over time. Our findings are contributions in that they qualify the widespread belief that the adoption of a new practice requires a combination of coercive, mimetic and normative forces [21] . When proposing changes in extant circuits of power with resilient discourses, organizations may not rely only on dispositional power -i.e on discourses; changes may not be implemented without deploying facilitative (coercive) power.
Examples of the need for facilitative power for introducing change in organizational fields have been documented widely in the literature. For example, Guler et al. [36] found that governmental bodies and multinationals apply coercive power effectively in the diffusion of quality management certificates. For example, the European Union has played a key role in requiring firms, especially new market entrants, to seek ISO 9000 certification, while the Singapore government mandates it for large construction firms wishing to register to undertake public-sector projects [59] . The coercive pressure for conformity plays a fundamental role in the diffusion of new organizational practices or strategies. We argue that without coercive power and if left to the market those proposed standards and certifications may have not been adopted.
Moreover, we hold that there is a relationship between time and the resilience of a discourse. We argue that the resilience of discourses will be stronger the longer they have been the dominant discourse in the circuits of power. In our case the market economy (principle of marginal utility) has been the prevailing rule of meaning in British businesses for many years. Indeed, the marginal utility principle lies at the core of any market economy and has done for centuries [69] .
Similar observations have been made by other researchers [80, 22] . For example, Vermeulen et.
al. [80] found that the Dutch government, in its attempt to create a market in the construction industry, failed to change the core beliefs in a market that had existed since the 19 th century.
Dokko et. al. [22] in a similar fashion suggest the resilience of discourses through time, as they explain technological change in organization fields from an evolutionary perspective. They explain the resistance to change in systems from the point of view of punctuated equilibrium: that systems tend to remain stable for long periods of time until change is introduced by disruptive contingencies [78, 34, 66] .
The notion of resilience is intimately connected to that of legitimacy which the literature recognizes as a fundamental and necessary attribute for the adoption of a standard or a certification scheme [63, 30, 69, 3, 38, 52] . Timmermans and Epstein [77] in their study of a resistance movement for altering the practices of standardizing human beings in biomedicine research observe that neither certificates nor standards can be adopted when they are deemed to have no legitimacy. Researchers have also pointed out the centrality of the discourse of legitimacy for the adoption of information security certification [44, 51, 43] . Instead of explaining adoption in terms of economic benefits, these researchers explore the sources of conformity and the organizational consequences of implementing certification. Accordingly, these studies have shown that holding a recognized certificate increases a firm's legitimacy, i.e. its good reputation and trustworthiness [4, 46, 62] . This institutionalization, they argue, is mainly the result of mimetic forces [20] whereby the firm imitates the practices of successful, dominant organizations. Our contribution here is to show what happens when two certificate schemes with dissimilar discourses compete. We discovered that the dominant one in the current circuits of power, i.e. the more resilient one, will prevail.
Non-Agentic Resistance
Our study also demonstrates that in the absence of disciplinary techniques, resistance to change in the circuits is not only offered by agencies but also by discourses. As observed above, in the absence of systemic power, disputes will occur between discourses. That is not to say that the discourses acted on their own, as clearly they achieved it through different agencies: government authorities, consultants, auditors and managers, just to mention some. What we observed, though, is that agencies seem not to be responding to personal interests but to be defending what they thought was rational and true [30, 32] . It was in this sense that we say that the discourses were the ones offering resistance. In our case, the competing discourses were marginal utility (low cost) against a discourse of quality (technical rigor and "in consultation with industry").
In our case we found that the As favored a technocratic discourse as they thought that competition between certificates would be based on quality. The belief in the superiority of the technocratic discourse was crystallized in the DTI's conviction that the more technical and rigorous the scheme the more attractive it would be for organizations. This is an example of what Andrew Feenberg [25] , the critical theorist of technology, calls technocracy, that is, the conviction that given its intricacies, technology development and its diffusion should be the responsibility of technical experts. The technocratic perspective of the DTI is also reflected in its over-reliance on consultants. Consultants were seen as experts in market studies and were also considered to be experts in financial matters. The DTI paid more attention to what the consultants were saying in respect of the market for c:cure than to the opinions of other members of the committee. Had the technocrats of the DTI questioned the strength of its technological discourse, they might not only have prevented the failure of c:cure but also saved at least one million British
Pounds. The over-reliance of the DTI on consultants and its failure sufficiently to heed key users reduced the chances of useful early feedback.
The non-agentic power of discourses and its relation to technological change is noted, for example, by Knights and McCabe [49] . In their study of Total Quality Management (TQM) programs Knights and McCabe, reflecting on the views of power of Foucault and Lukes, point out that power has to be understood beyond mere actions and highlight the relevance of the power of discourse. In their study they notice the non-agentic power of discourses that provide TQM programs with a sense of inevitability in fostering legitimacy in an organizational field. Similarly, in studying resistance in public management service, Thomas and Davis [75] challenge the dominant view of resistance as passive and behavioral, and argue for focusing on meanings and symbolic interpretation. Our contribution is to identify the circumstances in which non-agentic resistance will be predominant, that is when agencies promote changes in circuits of power without deploying facilitative power, but just through competition of discourses in a market economy.
CONCLUSION
In this research, we investigate the dynamics of institutionalizing an information security certification scheme in the UK. Our analysis raises important practical issues about both the creation and diffusion of certification schemes. As highlighted in the discussion, technical superiority does not necessarily hold sufficient attraction for the early adopters, and simplicity with broader collective objectives can become determining factors in the game of survival between two competing schemes. This study found that where two discourses compete, the more resilient discourse, the one more deeply rooted in the current circuits of power is the one that prevails: the market discourse takes precedence over that of technology. Furthermore our study confirms the role of the non-agentic resistance of discourses: discourses themselves compete when agencies may not be consciously resisting but rather merely defending what they see as rational and true. Our study once again underlines the critical importance of legitimacy in the standards and certification field. The two schemes were rooted in two different legitimacies, the technical rigor of c:cure against the international and low-cost nature of the generic certification scheme. Instead of technical rigor, market legitimacy won the day, underlining the power of a prevailing legitimacy.
In terms of practical implications, our findings related to circuit of systemic integration suggest that government or any agency promoting the adoption of a certification scheme may consider that in cases of low legitimation, coercive power may be the only way to ensure adoption. As coercive power is rarely deemed viable, especially in market economies and democratic societies, our study suggest that agencies proposing certification schemes should pay careful attention to and make efforts to strengthen the legitimacy of their proposal. For information security standards, our empirical study shows that potential adoptors still consider market legitimacy and logic as a determining factor in their evaluation of standard adoption. Over-reliance on technicalfeatured legitimacy could potentially lead to a failure in diffusing a new security technology standard.
In terms of research limitations, perhaps, the CoP does not function quite so well in a fluid situation when agents do not remain in the same role over time. In particular it may not be able to explain power relations when the clear distinction between As and Bs fails to apply or when there are changes in alliances such as As becoming Bs and vice-versa. In our data the BSI is an important standards player in the UK, but it also has a department of its organization (BSI-DISC) which was the business manager for the c:cure certification scheme business but also sold generic certification. This was an example of the overlapping of boundaries with a lack of clear distinction about whether an organization can be deemed irrefutably an A or a B.
Another limitation of the CoP that we found in our analysis is the mechanistic nature of the Obligatory Passage Point concept. This is clear metaphor for As who try to make Bs do something they otherwise would not do. Whilst this is useful as an indicator of when power is being exerted, there may be different interpretations about what may be obligatory. In our case the passing of regulation requiring organizations to acquire certification would have been a clear obligatory passage point. In our data though we find that the Bs were always able to decline certification, and c:cure in particular, because although demonstrating security was useful, it was not at the time necessary. So what was the passage point that ultimately failed? The failures were several and not just one.
In conclusion, this study has shown the contingent nature of the stabilization or institutionalization of a security certification scheme. We argue that the fate of a scheme will depend on the resistance in and around the different stakeholders. Although the area of standards and certification is broad because it encompasses different traditions -economic, institutional and critical -we hope our study constitutes a contribution to those literatures. We believe the political perspective for studying stabilization is an approach from which researchers can learn. This paper constitutes an effort in that direction.
